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Leading Articles
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL,
AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
Paul Tillett*
Mr. Justice Black's opinion in United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass'n' has been referred to as "the first since Mar-
shall's day to give the commerce clause an all-embracing yet state-
power-saving construction."2 Throughout his twenty-six years on
the United States Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Black has shown
himself to be an able advocate of Chief Justice Marshall's interpre-
tation of the clause which empowers Congress to "regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes." He is perhaps the first Justice since the time of
Chief Justice Marshall and Mr. Justice William Johnson to fully
understand Marshall's construction of this critical clause.
The commerce clause does not explain what power over com-
merce, if any, is left to the states. Since Chief Justice Marshall's
first attempt to clarify this relationship in Gibbons v. Ogden,3 the
Court has adopted a series of constitutional doctrines, none of which
can be regarded as having finally resolved the issues. The Justices,
however, have pointed out again and again the important direct
effect judicial application of this clause has upon the nation's
economic and social systems and the distribution of powers in our
federal system.
Mr. Justice Black has adopted a view of the commerce clause
which not only gives broad scope to federal power, but also gives
the states "wider authority than they have ever had."'4 In so doing,
he has drawn on the major premises laid down by Marshall, while
contributing his own insights into the governmental adjustments
* A.B., 1944, Wesleyan University; J.D., 1949, University of Chicago; Ph.D.,
1957, Princeton University; Associate Director of the Eagleton Institute
of Politics; Associate Professor of Political Science at Rutgers, The State
University; Research Assistant, 1949-50, University of Nebraska College
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1322 U.S. 533 (1944).
2 MASON & BEANEY, AERIcAN CONsTIoNAL LAw 190 (2d ed. 1959).
322 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
4FRANK, Mit. JUsTIcE BLACK, THE MAN AD His OPnnoNs 110 (1949).
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appropriate to the complexities of the modern economy. A com-
parison of the positions of Justices Marshall and Black will be
made in the following areas:
1. What is the power granted the federal government by the
commerce clause?
2. What power over commerce is retained by the states?
3. To what branch of the federal government is the commerce
power given?
FEDERAL POWER UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
In Gibbons v. Ogden, Marshall examined the nature of the
commerce power and immediately gave it a broad and an all-
embracing definition. He agreed with counsel for the appellee who
defined commerce in terms of the buying or the selling or the
exchanging of commodities by stating that "commerce, undoubt-
edly, is traffic." He continued, however, to say that "it is something
more-it is intercourse," and as such it "describes the commercial
intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches,
and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that inter-
course."5 Marshall thus not only gave commerce a broad definition,
but also found positive power in the national government to regu-
late such commerce.
What is the extent of this power? Marshall pointed out that the
power is applied to commerce "among the several states," and that
"among" means "intermingled with." He stated that "commerce
among the states cannot stop at the external boundary line of each
state, but may be introduced into the interior." Furthermore, the
power to regulate, "like all others vested in congress, may be
exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations,
orher [sic] than are prescribed in the Constitution." Power over
commerce among the states "is vested in congress as absolutely as it
would be in a single government."6 In such sweeping terms he
made it possible for Congress to regulate any aspect of commercial
life which affected more than one state; and, in regulating, to pre-
scribe the "rules by which commerce is to be governed," including
measures to prohibit, direct and control as well as measures to
foster and promote.7
522 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 83 (1824).
6 Id. at 85, 86.
7 MASON & BEANEY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 183.
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Hugo Black came to the Court in 1937. Since, he has joined all
opinions giving wide scope to the federal power of regulating com-
merce. He foreshadowed adherence to a broad interpretation of
the commerce clause during his career as a United States Senator
when he restated the Marshall position that Congress' power to
regulate interstate commerce is "supreme, as it would be in any
single state" 8 and by his sponsorship of such legislation as the
Black-Connery Bill for a thirty-hour week.
Shortly after Black's accession to the bench, in United States v.
Rock Royal Co-op.,9 the Justices sustained an order of the
Secretary of Agriculture, issued in the New York metropolitan
area, fixing minimum prices to be paid for milk to dairy farmers.
The Court's opinion stated that since two-thirds of the milk pro-
duced for the New York marketing area actually moved in inter-
state commerce and the remaining one-third was physically and
"inextricably intermingled" with the interstate milk, and all was
handled in the current of interstate commerce, Congress could
regulate all. Justices Black and Douglas, concurring separately,
did not think that the case called for the implication that the power
of Congress to enact the marketing law depended upon "the use and
nature of milk"; for them it was not necessary to imply "that there
is such a constitutional limitation on the power of Congress to
regulate interstate commerce."' 0
Following this initial indication of the wide scope he would
allow Congress in regulating commerce, Black delivered several
majority opinions which expanded the meaning of commerce in
order to validate federal regulation.' When the majority ruled that
the Western Union Telegraph Company 12 was not prohibited by
the act from employing child labor since it was not a "producer"
8 79 CONG. Rac. 758 (1935).
9 307 U.S. 533, 560 (1938).
'Old. at 582.
11 In NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing Ass'n, 310 U.S. 318, 326 (1939), Black, for
the Court, held the National Labor Relations Act applicable to "a proc-
essor, who constitutes even a relatively small percentage of his in-
dustry's capacity, where the materials processed are moved to and from
the processor by their owners through the channels of interstate com-
merce. . . ." And in Walton, Adm'x v. Southern Package Corp., 320 U.S.
540, 542 (1944), he reasoned that a night watchman for a manufacturing
plant which shipped a substantial portion of its products interstate was
covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as one engaged in an
occupation "necessary to the production" of goods for interstate com-
merce.
12 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490 (1945).
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and did not "ship" messages in interstate commerce, Black joined
the dissent of Mr. Justice Murphy. They protested that semantic
niceties should not require the sacrifice of social gains and saw no
reason for holding that the telegraph company was not engaged
in interstate commerce. In two later majority opinions, Black again
asserted the full breadth of commerce power, permitting the federal
government "to block navigation at one place to foster it at
another" 13 and ruling that trade in news carried on among the
states was likewise subject to federal control.14
But, for a latitudinarian interpretation of federal commerce
power, no modern opinion compares with Black's explanation of
the decision in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n.15
He ruled that insurance is commerce in the constitutional sense,
and thus over-turned the seventy-five year old precedent of Paul v.
Virginia." "Not only, then, may transactions be commerce though
non-commercial," he noted, but "they may be commerce though
illegal or sporadic, and though they do not utilize common carriers
or concern the flow of anything more tangible than electrons and
information."' 7
Another case,'8 decided the same day, upheld the application
of the National Labor Relations Act to the activities of the Polish
Alliance, another insurance company. A majority of five, however,
did so on grounds that differed considerably from the basis of
Black's opinion in South-Eastern Underwriters. According to Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, who wrote for the Court, the practices engaged
in by the Polish Alliance were unfair labor practices "affecting
commerce." Black, in a concurring opinion, objected to Frank-
furter's interpretation of the facts found by the National Labor
Relations Board. "Its findings," according to Black, "was that the
petitioner, being 'engaged in the insurance business', was 'engaged
in commerce within the meaning of the Act." '19 Its labor practices
were, therefore, subject to federal regulation as commerce, not as
activities "affecting commerce." To bring the case under the rubric
of those "affecting commerce," he went on, the Board should have
'
3 United States v. Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U.S. 386, 393 (1945).
'4 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
15322 U.S. 533 (1944).
1675 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
'
7 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 332 U.S. 533, 549-50
(1944).
18Polish Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643, 648, 651 (1944).
19 Id. at 651. (Emphasis added.)
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found that the business of the Polish Alliance "affected interstate
activities of other businesses.120 It did not so find.
In summary, Black's position on the scope of federal power
under the commerce clause reflects a recognition that to accept
a definition less comprehensive than the familiar one given by
Marshall "would deprive the Congress of that full power necessary
to enable it to discharge its constitutional duty to govern commerce
among the states"; the power is "positive" and authorizes Congress
to reach affairs the individual states "are not fully capable of
governing." Finally, "no commercial enterprise of any kind which
conducts its activities across state lines has been held to be wholly
beyond the regulatory powers of Congress under the Commerce
Clause."21
STATE POWER UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
Does the commerce clause foreclose state regulations? May the
state regulate local commerce affecting other states in the absence
of federal legislation or until the Congress exercises its supreme
power? What is the extent to which, and the circumstances under
which, the United States Supreme Court should invalidate state
regulations when Congress has not acted? These are the perplexing
questions which the Court has debated and decided, but never
finally resolved.
In Gibbons v. Ogden, Marshall concluded that "the completely
internal commerce of a state . . . may be considered as reserved
for the state itself. ' 22 He did not agree with Mr. Justice Johnson
that "the grant of this power carries with it the whole subject,
leaving nothing for the state to act upon.123
But what of state legislation adopted to accomplish an ad-
mittedly local purpose but which, nevertheless, affects commerce
among the states? It is settled that federal legislation will supersede
inconsistent state regulation.24 The more difficult cases arise when
20 Id. at 653.
21 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 550-53
(1944).
2222 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 8 (1824).
23 Id. at 26.
24 Black has contributed to this doctrine. In Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines,
348 U.S. 61 (1954), the Court ruled that a state may not deny the use of
state highways to federally licensed motor carriers as punishment for
repeated violations of state laws. Black reasoned that the suspension
of the common carrier's right to use Illinois highways would be "the
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Congress chooses not to legislate from lack of concern, inability to
agree, or the impossibility of legislating nationally for diverse local
situations. In these circumstances, Marshall declared that the states
retained the entire power of "internal police," a vast mass of
regulatory authority; and, he allowed for the possibility that in the
exercise of rightful state authority their laws would touch upon
matters he had previously included in the commerce concept. Was
this not a contradiction? By no means, for Marshall made clear that
state legislation was only valid when it did not interfere with acts
of Congress passed in pursuance of the Constitution. Where there
was conflict, "that which is not supreme must yield to that which is
supreme. '25 Consequently, state legislation may not interfere with
any federal regulation of commerce. Equally, by implication, the
states are free to exercise their power of "internal police," even in
areas affecting commerce, until Congress acts. While it may well
have been the intention of the framers of the commerce clause to
avoid the "Balkanization" of the American economy, Marshall
believed they placed the primary responsibility for effectuating this
purpose on the Congress. With congressional inaction, the nation
could indeed be "Balkanized" commercially by the states; but, an
active and alert national legislature had full power to prevent it.
As a Virginian, Marshall recognized that the effective regulation
of local problems belongs to the states.26 Thus, at the same time
that he derived from the commerce clause a strict limitation upon
state power, he also conceded that the states retained authority to
control varying local conditions in the federal society established by
equivalent of a partial suspension of its federally granted certificate."
Since, however, the federal act had required that motor carriers abide
by valid state highway regulations, he added that it was incumbent upon
the Interstate Commerce Commission to protect the state's interest,
either on the Commission's own initiative or on complaint of the state.
Id. at 65. Similarly, in Chicago v. Atchison, 357 U.S. 77, 89 (1957),
Black held that the City of Chicago had no power to decide whether
motor carriers could operate transfer service between terminals for
interstate railroads. Such transfer service "is an integral part of the
interstate transportation authorized and subject to regulation under the
Interstate Commerce Act." The best capsule description of affirmative
congressional authority is that of Mr. Justice Douglas: "Congress may,
if it chooses, take unto itself all regulatory authority ... share the task
with the States, or adopt as federal policy the state scheme of regula-
tion." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 229 (1947).
25 Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 448 (1827).
26 FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND
WAiTE 27 (1937). See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,
445-47 (1821).
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the Constitution. His conception of state power was applied in
Wilson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 27 where he upheld the
validity of an act of the state of Delaware authorizing the Blackbird
Creek Marsh Company to construct a dam across a navigable tidal
creek flowing into the Delaware River, although the dam obstructed
navigation of the creek.
Marshall emphasized that if the Congress, in executing its
power to regulate commerce, had enacted positive legislation de-
signed to control navigation in tidal creeks, the state act would have
been void. The state act, however, came into conflict with no act of
Congress. "We do not think," stated Marshall, "that the act em-
powering the Blackbird Creek Marsh Company to place a dam
across the creek, can, under all the circumstances of the case, be
considered as repugnant to the power to regulate commerce in its
dormant state, or as being in conflict with any law passed on the
subject."28
Marshall thus preserved ultimate federal supremacy yet found
that the local government's purposes of improvement of health and
enhancement of property values was sufficient justification for the
exercise of state authority. These aims were outside the scope
of national power and Marshall implied that the Delaware statute
fell outside the ban of the "dormant" commerce clause because it
was not a regulation of commerce, but of "police."
Mr. Justice Thompson, in a concurring opinion to New York v.
Miln,29 stated that Marshall's decision suggested a "strong case to
show that a power admitted to fall within the power to regulate
commerce may be exercised by the states until Congress assumes
the exercise." The inference would seem to be that if Congress
never exercised its authority over commerce, the states would
remain free to regulate their internal affairs under the police
power, even if such regulations affected interstate commerce.
Dormancy of federal authority, not the pragmatic test of the later
case of Cooley v. Board of Wardens,30 was the measure of state
power. Marshall did not go so far explicitly, but his opinion placed
him on the side of a variety of federalism which would leave a
wide field of action to the states where the national government has
2727 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
28 Id. at 252. (Emphasis added.)
2936 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 149 (1837).
3053 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
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failed to act, but which would also give Congress broad powers
when it chooses to act.
BLACK'S VIEW OF STATE POWER
After a career as a liberal senator and loyal supporter of the
New Deal, Black was expected to become influential in increasing
the power of the national government at the expense of the states.
But it soon became apparent that he was committed to the proposi-
tion that the states retained extensive powers. Black, as John P.
Frank has indicated, believes in "dynamic" government, and he
thinks the Constitution grants abundant power for that type of
government to both the state and the federal governments. Sig-
nificantly, he has stayed outside the orbit of the stale controversy
between "states rights" and "centralized power." It is not a ques-
tion merely of which government shall prevail between the states
and the nation. "Instead," Frank observed, "the question is which
government is actually prepared at this moment to do the actual
job that some group in the community thinks ought to be done. '31
Who is to decide which group is prepared to do the job? Black's
answer is clear. It is not the courts, but the legislators. On this point
Black has upon many occasions differed, sometimes very strongly,
with his judicial colleagues.
When Black came to the Court, he joined in the decision of
South Carolina v. Barnwell Bros.,32 which, in the absence of
national legislation, sustained state power to regulate the length and
width of vehicles using state highways whether moving in interstate
commerce or moving only within the state. Judicial inquiry was to
be limited to the question of whether the restrictions imposed were
reasonably adapted to the ends sought, namely conserving the high-
ways and promoting public safety. But the opinion for the Court,
citing Willson and Cooley, also observed: "While the constitutional
grant to Congress of power to regulate interstate commerce has
been held to operate of its own force to curtail state power in some
measure, it did not forestall all state action affecting interstate
commerce. '33 In a footnote to this observation, the Court ex-
plained: 34
State regulations affecting interstate commerce, whose purpose
or effect is to gain for those within the state an advantage at the
31 FRAN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 110.
32 303 U.S. 177 (1937).
33 Id. at 184-85.
34 Id. at 184-85 n.2.
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expense of those without, or to burden those out of the state without
any corresponding advantage to those within, have been thought
to impinge upon the constitutional prohibition even though Con-
gress has not acted.
With this reasoning Black was in accord. The same year he
vigorously dissented from a determination that the commerce clause
restricts nondiscriminatory application of state taxing power.35 An
Indiana gross income tax, applied to income derived from sales in
other states, was ruled unconstitutional as a "burden" on interstate
commerce. Black pointed out that the tax was general, did not
discriminate against interstate commerce, and fell uniformly on all
gross income. It did not contravene any law of Congress. He de-
plored striking down the statute because of "merely possible future
unfair burdens," stating: 36
Until Congress, in the exercise of its plenary power over interstate
commerce, fixes a different policy, it would appear desirable that
the States should remain free to adopt tax systems imposing uni-
form and non-discriminatory taxes upon interstate and intrastate
business alike.
He agreed with the majority, citing Gibbons v. Ogden, that the
power of Congress was complete. But complete power had not been
exercised. Furthermore, "taxation and regulation are not synony-
mous; all state, county and city taxes that affect interstate com-
merce do not 'regulate' it in the constitutional sense." Black feared
that the Court's interpretation would lead to a construction exempt-
ing enterprises engaged in interstate commerce from all state taxes
on interstate receipts. This, he believed, would "impose an unfair
and discriminatory burden upon local intrastate business." He con-
cluded that "the interests of interstate commerce will best be
fostered, preserved and protected-in the absence of direct regu-
lation by the Congress-by leaving those engaged in it in the various
States subject to the ordinary and non-discriminatory taxes of the
States from which they receive governmental protection.
'37
He hewed to the same line in Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v.
Henneford,38 where he dissented from a majority opinion which
invalidated a Washington gross receipts tax, stating:3 9
It is essential today, as at the time of adoption of the Constitu-
tion, that commerce among the States and with foreign nations
35 Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938).
36 Id. at 327.
3T Id. at 333.
38 305 U.S. 434 (1939).
39 Id. at 455.
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be left free from discriminatory and retaliatory burdens imposed
by the States. It is of equal importance, however, that the judicial
department of our government scrupulously observe its consti-
tutional limitations and that Congress alone should adopt a broad
national policy of regulation-if otherwise valid state laws combine
to hamper the free flow of commerce.
In McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines,40 Black again pointed
to the Court's limited responsibility for the effects of state legis-
lation. Federal legislation, rather than judicial proceedings, would
be required to accomplish appropriate uniformity in the regulation
of interstate commerce:41
Unconfined by the 'narrow scope of judicial proceedings' Con-
gress alone can, in the exercise of its plenary constitutional con-
trol over interstate commerce, not only consider whether such a
tax.., is consistent with the best interests of our national economy,
but can also on the basis of full exploration of the many aspects
of a complicated problem devise a national policy fair alike to the
States and our Union. Diverse and interacting state laws may well
have created avoidable hardships .... But the remedy, if any is
called for, we think is within ample reach of Congress.
The fact that Black has upheld state power in all these opinions
would seem to indicate that he adheres to the Cooley dictum, "let
commerce struggle for congressional act to make it free." He would
not make the dictum absolute, however. In Best & Company v.
Maxwell,42 he joined a unanimous decision that North Carolina
could not tax out-of-state merchants where the "actual effect" of
the tax was to "discriminate in favor of intrastate business."
THE ROOSEVELT COURT
In 1941, the bench experienced several personnel changes and
its doctrines shifted perceptibly toward a more generous interpre-
tation of government powers, including those of the states. 43 For a
period, the Justices unanimously rejected challenges to specific
instances of the exercise of state authority in areas affecting com-
merce. The new Chief Justice, Harlan F. Stone, made himself the
Court's spokesman in such cases and usually spoke for an unanimous
Court. His opinions did not evoke the separate expression of Black's
views while harmony was the rule. When the Justices sustained an
Arkansas statute requiring a permit for the transportation of in-
40 309 U.S. 176 (1940).
41 Id. at 189.
42 311 U.S. 454, 457 (1940).
4 3 CoRwIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, LTD. (7th rev. ed. 1941).
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toxicating liquor through the state,44 Mr. Justice Jackson, con-
curring, hinted that trouble lay ahead by voicing his concern that
the Court was permitting an "unwise extension of state power over
interstate commerce." "[D]efault of action by us," he stated, "will go
on suffocating and retarding and Balkanizing American commerce,
trade and industry. ' 45
In another far-reaching decision, the Justices unanimously ap-
proved a state-sponsored monopoly of marketing for California
raisins, even though California farmers grow nearly all of the raisins
consumed in the United States, and sell most of the crop outside
of the state.46 A comprehensive scheme of federal agricultural
regulations also existed, though it had not been applied to raisins.
Chief Justice Stone held that there was no conflict between the state
plan and the federal agricultural program. The Sherman Act had
no application because that law made no mention of the states. The
California arrangement did not interfere with interstate marketing
because the regulation of raisins before they were ready for ship-
ment out of a state was described as a local activity. As to this,
Stone wrote: 47
When Congress has not exerted its power under the Commerce
Clause, and state regulation of matters of local concern is so related
to interstate commerce that it also operates as a regulation of that
commerce, the reconciliation of the power thus granted with that
reserved to the state is to be attained by the accommodation of
the competing demands of the state and national interests involved.
According to Stone, the judiciary was to weigh competing de-
mands and accommodate them. And the state regulation was to be
upheld because: 48
[U]pon a consideration of all the relevant facts and circumstances
it appears that the matter is one which may appropriately be
regulated in the interest of the safety, health and well-being of
local communities, and which, because of its local character, and
the practical difficulties involved, may never be adequately dealt
with by Congress.
As the Justices were unanimous, both on the result and the rea-
soning, it may have seemed that they would never find an instance
of state power exercised in forbidden territory. Curiously, when dis-
agreement arose, it betrayed itself first in the insurance case, South-
44 Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390 (1941).
45 Id. at 400.
46 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
47 Id. at 362.
48 Id. at 362-63.
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Eastern Underwriters, where state power was discussed only inci-
dentally. On this point, Justices Stone and Jackson, dissenting, as-
sumed that the decision would automatically wipe out state regula-
tion over all aspects of the insurance business. Stone seemed to
think that if insurance were held to be commerce, the commerce
clause of its own force would preclude state action. He pointed to
the effective systems of regulating insurance which the states had
developed, enabling them to solve regulatory problems of a local
character "with which it would be impractical or difficult for
Congress to deal through the exercise of the commerce power. '40
Black, however, pointed out that the decision would not prevent
state regulation of insurance rates so long as such regulations did
not conflict with the provisions of the Sherman Act. In language
which closely resembled that used by Stone in Parker v. Brown, he
explained: 50
It is settled that, for Constitutional purposes, certain activities of a
business may be intrastate and therefore subject to state control,
while other activities of the same business may be interstate and
therefore subject to federal regulation. And there is a wide range
of business and other activities which, though subject to federal
regulation, are so intimately related to local welfare that, in the
absence of Congressional action, they may be regulated by the
states. In marking out these activities the primary test applied
by the Court is not the mechanical one of whether the particular
activity affected by the state regulation is part of interstate com-
merce, but rather whether, in each case, the competing demands
of the state and national interests involved can be accommodated.
And the fact that particular phases of an interstate business or
activity have long been regulated or taxed by states has been
recognized as a strong reason why, in the continued absence of
conflicting Congressional action, the state regulatory and tax laws
should be declared valid.
To meet the uncertainties arising about the validity of state
laws and other regulatory provisions governing insurance com-
panies, Congress passed the McCarran Act,51 handing back to the
states the power some thought they had lost as a result of judicial
decision. The Supreme Court ratified this legislative measure and
suggested that coordinated state and national action could "achieve
legislative consequences, particularly in the fields of regulating
commerce and taxation, which, to some extent, at least, neither
could accomplish in isolated exertion. ' 52
49 322 U.S. 533, 580 (1943).
50 Id. at 548-49.
51McCarran-Ferguson Insurance Regulation Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15
(1958).
52 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 439 (1946).
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The hidden conflict over state powers in the commerce field
became overt in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona 3 where Stone, for
the majority, invoking the "balancing" concept, observed that where
uniformity is judged by the Court to be "essential for the function-
ing of commerce," a state may not interpose its regulation. On this
basis he held that a local regulation limiting interstate and intra-
state freight trains to seventy cars was invalid. Black objected
vigorously, stating that the determination of whether it is the in-
terest of society for the length of trains to be governmentally reg-
ulated is a matter of public policy. "A century and a half of con-
stitutional history and government," he wrote, "admonishes the
Court to leave choice to elected representatives of the people them-
selves, where it properly belongs, both on democratic principles
and by the requirements of efficient government. '54
The following year, in Morgan v. Virginia55 the majority in-
validated a Virginia statute which prescribed racial segregation on
buses. The basis for the decision was that a single, uniform rule
was required to promote and protect national travel. This time
Black concurred, but he could not be persuaded that the courts,
rather than Congress, should regulate commerce. "I acquiesce," he
said, "but only so long as the Court remains committed to the 'undue
burden on commerce formula.' 56
JACKSON'S "NEW APPROACH"
The controversy over state power, which had been brewing
within the Court since the insurance cases, came to a head after the
death of Chief Justice Stone. Mr. Justice Jackson emerged as the
spokesman for the Court in H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond. 7 Jack-
son's majority opinion ruled that the New York Commissioner of
Agriculture and Markets could not refuse a license for a milk re-
ceiving station to a Massachusetts corporation on the ground that
the new station would subject others to competition and take sup-
plies needed locally. The Constitution, through the commerce
clause, established the policy of free trade among the states. Jack-
son declared: 58
Our system fostered by the Commerce Clause is that every farmer
and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the cer-
53 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
54 Id. at 789.
55 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
56 Id. at 387-88.
57 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
58 Id. at 539.
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tainty that he will have free access to every market in the Nation,
that no home embargoes will withhold his exports .... Likewise,
every consumer may look to the free competition from every pro-
ducing area in the Nation to protect him from exploitation by any.
The policy of federal free trade emphasizes "the necessity of
protecting interstate movement of goods against local burdens and
repressions." He pointed to the consequences if Detroit auto
manufacturers were required to satisfy Michigan's demands for
cars before any could be exported beyond the state's borders. 59
Jackson's opinion did not assert an "undue burden"; it simply said
that the state regulation in question was a forbidden end in an area
where the Justices had recently upheld state power.60
Dissenting forcefully, Black criticized the Court's "new ap-
proach" because it was "inconceivable that Congress could pass
uniform national legislation capable of adjustment and application
to all the local phases of interstate activities that take place in the
forty-eight states." The new doctrine inevitably would reconstitute
an area of economic activity immune from government control: 61
It is always a serious thing for this Court to strike down a state-
wide law. It is more serious when the state law falls under a new
rule which will inescapably narrow the area in which states can
regulate and control local business practices found inimical to
the public welfare. The gravity of striking down state regulations
is immeasurably increased when it results as here in leaving a no-
man's land immune from any effective regulation whatever.
Black believed that the doctrine put forth in Duckworth v.
Arkansas62 had been rejected by the majority and he criticized the
Court for basing its decision on Mr. Justice Jackson's earlier con-
curring opinion. He also pointed out that Congress had "explicitly
commanded cooperation" in the Agricultural Marketing Agreement
Act.63 Since both the state and the federal governments had clear
interests in this area, the question, in Black's mind, turned to the
role of the Court in recognizing these interests. In the Senate,
Black had attacked the old Court's interpretation of the due process
clause as judicial usurpation, incompatible with democracy. Mr.
Justice Black continued the attack: 64
59 Id. at 539. This consideration seemed more compelling in 1949, than in
1961 when automobiles were in good supply, to say the least.
60Milk Control Bd. v. Eisenberg Co., 306 U.S. 346, 353 (1939); Baldwin
v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
61 H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 562 (1949).
62 314 U.S. 390 (1941).
63 Id. at 559.
64 Id. at 562-63.
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The due process clause and commerce clause have been used like
Siamese twins in a never-ending stream of challenges to govern-
ment regulation.
Both the commerce and due process clauses serve high purposes
when confined within their proper scope. But a stretching of either
outside its sphere can paralyze the legislative process, rendering
the people's legislative representatives impotent to perform their
duty of providing appropriate rules to govern this dynamic civiliza-
tion. Both clauses easily lend themselves to inordinate expansions
of this Court's power at the expense of legislative power.
In Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison 5 the Court once again
refused to uphold state power. A city ordinance forbidding the sale
of milk as pasteurized, unless pasteurized within five miles of the
city, was said to constitute "unjustifiable discrimination" against
interstate commerce. Black dissented. Agreeing with the state
courts, Black stated that the ordinance represented a "good-faith
attempt to safeguard public health by making adequate sanitation
inspection possible." The fact that a health regulation "imposes a
burden on trade," said Black, "does not mean that it discriminates
against interstate commerce." 66
Black's views have not yet attracted a consistent majority of
his colleagues. In 1949, the Justices adopted Black's view that non-
discriminatory state taxes were valid although levied on interstate
businesses. "If a new rule... is to be declared," he wrote, "we think
Congress should do it." 67 The Court has in most other cases followed
the Cooley rationale, which is that the commerce clause in its "dor-
mant" state requires a consideration of "all the circumstances of the
case," but leaves with the Court the task of deciding when state
regulation imposes an "undue burden" on commerce.
In the long run, Black's intention in South-Eastern Under-
writers to free state commercial regulations from federal judicial
control has been frustrated. Mr. Justice Jackson has been suc-
ceeded by Mr. Justice Douglas as the opponent of state regulation
and as the spokesman for a thorough-going nationalism which has
risen on the bench in recent years.
One recent case, Bibb v. Navaho Freight Lines, s at first blush
raises a question of whether Mr. Justice Black has not given up his
65 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
66 Id. at 358.
67 Capital Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542, 547 (1950). Accord,
Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960), upholding as "nondis-
criminatory" a Florida statute requiring foreign corporations to collect
use taxes on Florida sales.
68359 U.S. 520 (1959).
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interpretation of the commerce clause. He silently acquiesced in
an opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas which invalidated an Illinois law
requiring trucks and trailers to use "contour and flaps."- Illinois
alone had this requirement, and as applied to interstate carriers it
interfered with "inter-line operations." An unanimous Court de-
clared the statute void. Mr. Justice Douglas condemned the statute
on three grounds. First, it was "one of those cases-few in number
-where local safety measures that are non-discriminatory place an
unconstitutional burden on commerce." He continued, "the conflict
between the Arkansas regulation and the Illinois regulation also
suggests that this regulation of mud guards is not one of those mat-
ters admitting of diversity of treatment, according to the special
requirements of local conditions" and thus a legitimate object of
state regulation under the Cooley doctrine. Nor could the statute
be saved simply because Illinois' safety standards, though unique,
were so demonstrably superior to prevailing usage that "the in-
novating state need not be the one to give way."
Black came to the point again in 1961 and 1962 where the ma-
jority extended the logic of its own doctrine or fashioned a new
formula to release business from local regulation. While it is beyond
the scope of this discussion to consider the doctrine of federal pre-
emption, that line of cases obviously has some bearing on the line
developed where Congress has not legislated. The lines seemed, in
the minds of the Justices, to have crossed in Campbell v. Hussey.69
This was an action by tobacco auction warehousemen to restrain
enforcement of the Georgia Tobacco Identification Act. The Sec-
retary of Agriculture was authorized by statute to establish grades
for tobacco as "the official standards of the United States." In his
regulations, he determined that the "type" of tobacco was to be
determined by characteristics which could be determined by ex-
amination of the tobacco "regardless of any factors of historical or
geographical nature." Georgia regulations, on the other hand, de-
fined "Type 14" as "that flue-cured leaf tobacco grown in the tradi-
tional loose-leaf area which consists of the State (s) of Georgia,
Florida, and Alabama." State law required that such tobacco be
identified by "a white sheet ticket." The Court, through Mr. Justice
Douglas, determined that federal statutes providing for the grading
of tobacco pre-empted the field and left no room for state regulation.
Justices Black, Frankfurter and Harlan dissented in an opinion
written by Mr. Justice Black.
The whole purpose of federal regulation, as Mr. Justice Douglas
saw it, had been to establish uniform standards of classification for
69 368 U.S. 297 (1961).
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the protection of growers. Thus, the case did not present a question
of conflict, but of federal pre-emption. When a field has been pre-
empted, he reasoned, "complementary state regulation is as fatal
as state regulation which conflicts with the federal scheme."
From the standpoint of the thesis developed herein, it is not
surprising that Mr. Justice Black dissented; it is remarkable, how-
ever, that Justices Frankfurter and Harlan joined him. Federal reg-
ulations, the dissenters observed, established 27 types and 170 grades
of tobacco. Type 14, found in the federal regulations, was close to
the definition of Type 14 in the Georgia statute. Federal regulation
did not require the type to be shown on the official grading tag.
This may have been because type is almost invariably a geograph-
ical quality, and most tobacco is locally sold. At any rate, this was
the position of the dissenters.70
Testimony in the lower court strongly pointed to an abuse
growing up in the loop-hole in federal regulations because Type 14
had come to enjoy "the reputation of being the best tobacco pro-
duced in the United States. '7 1 "Growers and speculators from areas
outside Georgia, Florida and Alabama have taken advantage of the
general similarity and appearance of all types of flue-cured tobacco
in order to sell their tobacco on Georgia markets as Type 14," de-
clared the dissenters. This practice had led Georgia to the adop-
tion of the controverted statute. In Florida, it led the Federal De-
partment of Agriculture to require identification tags for all "to-
bacco offered for sale at auction which is determined to have been
produced in Georgia, Florida, or Alabama. '72 The absence of con-
flict could hardly have been made more plain. The possible contra-
diction between this regulation and the requirement that the stand-
ards be based on criteria other than those of geography and history
was resolved by noting that factors of soil and climate in Georgia,
Florida and Alabama produced "characteristics" discoverable by
chemical examination.7 3 Thus, "the full effect" of state law was to
enable buyers to distinguish federal Type 14 from all other types.
In this view of the case, the majority's decision, said the dis-
senters, "departs drastically from its long-continued practice of not
striking down state laws as unconstitutional except where such
decisions are compelled by considerations which are manifest and
70 Id. at 309, n.17.
71 Id. at 304.
72 Id. at 306.
73 Id. at 306.
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clear after careful study and analysis of the issues involved."74 The
imprecision of this language may express the price Mr. Justice
Black had to pay for obtaining the agreement of Justices Frank-
furter and Harlan. For himself it was perhaps enough that there
was no conflict and that Congress had evidenced an intention to
pre-empt the field. For his colleagues, however, the sentence just
quoted may be deemed to have brought in its train the host of con-
siderations going into the operation of balancing the interests of
state and nation.
The greater part of Mr. Justice Black's dissenting opinion is
given over to an analysis of the authorities cited by Mr. Justice
Douglas. To support his decision, Douglas reached back to the Taft
Court, when the Justices were more prone than they are today to
apply mechanical concepts without analysis. In the instance cited,
Missouri Pac. R. R. v. Porter,75 Mr. Justice Butler found that "Con-
gress had entered upon the regulation... of transportation over an
interstate inland route to a seaport for delivery to a foreign vessel
for ocean carriage to a nonadjacent foreign country," even though
the Interstate Commerce Act and various amendments did not speak
to the situation confronting the court, because Congress had given
the Commission sufficient general power to control the situation, if
exercised. Therefore, no state act (whether the court considered
the Arkansas statute in question, contradictory or complementary
to federal law does not appear) could apply. "Congress," Mr. Justice
Butler wrote, "must be deemed to have determined that the rule
laid down and the means provided to enforce it are sufficient and
that no other regulation is necessary. '76 It followed, therefore,
that state laws "cannot be applied in coincidence with, as com-
plementary to, or as in opposition to, federal enactments which
disclose the intention of Congress to enter a field of regulation that
is within its jurisdiction. '77 The language of that case and perhaps
the result seems to this observer to support Mr. Justice Douglas,
but Mr. Justice Black, it would seem, gave the better reading to
Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp.78 Black argued that the court would
not rule that a federal statute pre-empted a field previously oc-
cupied by the states unless a purpose to pre-empt was "the clear and
74 Id. at 307.
75 273 U.S. 341, 345 (1927).
76 Id. at 345-46.
77 Id. at 346. Cf. Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 277, 312 (1961).
78331 U.S. 218 (1947).
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manifest purpose of Congress." In the Rice case, Mr. Justice Doug-
las said: 7 9
Congress legislated here in a field which the States have tradi-
tionally occupied. . . . So we start with the assumption that the
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by
the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress .... Such a purpose may be evidenced in several ways.
The scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States
to supplement it .... Or the act of Congress may touch a field in
which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system
will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same
subject.... Likewise, the object sought to be obtained by the fed-
eral law and the character of obligation imposed by it may reveal
the same purpose .... Or the state policy may produce a result in-
consistent with the federal statute. . . . It is often a perplexing
question whether Congress has precluded state action or by the
choice of selective regulatory measures has left the police power
of the States undisturbed except as the state and federal regulations
collide.
In Campbell v. Hussey,8 0 Mr. Justice Douglas did not venture
upon the analysis which seemed to have been made requisite by
the tests suggested in the foregoing paragraph. Black, it should be
noted, voted with the majority in the Rice case.
The last case cited by Mr. Justice Douglas to support his posi-
tion was that of H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, which is not a case
of pre-emption at all; the idea is not conveyed in terms or by im-
plication, since the inhibition on state power was found by Mr.
Justice Jackson to flow from one of the "great silences" of the
Constitution.
In the more restricted field of insurance, the implication of
Black's opinion in South-Eastern Underwriters fared no better. The
majority was unwilling to acknowledge that the case impaired the
authority of earlier decisions limiting state power to tax out-of-state
insurance companies. Again, it was Mr. Justice Douglas, spokesman
for the nationalist majority, who expressed the view that the Mc-
Carran Act did not affect the court's decisions previous to South-
Eastern Underwriters which had placed limitations on state power 8 '
and Mr. Justice Black dissented alone.
In 1963, in Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental
79 Id. at 230-31.
80 368 U.S. 277 (1961).
81 Connecticut General [Life] Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77 (1938); St.
Louis Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U.S. 346 (1922); Allgeyer
v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
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Airlines,8 2 Mr. Justice Black explained that the Illinois statute in
the Bibb case placed a "substantial economic burden on com-
merce. '83 He also stated that there was no "one, sure test for de-
ciding these burden-on-commerce cases."8 4 A state commission could
order the end of racial discrimination in the hiring of airline pilots
by interstate carrier on the grounds that hiring was "much more
localized" than transport but "more significantly" because the likeli-
hood of conflicting federal policies was "virtually non-existent."
Continental Airlines seems to represent a shift toward acceptance
of the Cooley balancing-of-interests doctrine. In Morgan v. Vir-
ginia,5 Mr. Justice Black announced that he would follow the
Cooley rule as long as the majority did, even though he did not
agree that the Court should make policy. After thirteen years he
broke his silence in H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond 6 and Dean Milks7
because, in his judgment, the majority there "set up a new con-
stitutional formula" more difficult for state legislation to meet than
the Cooley rule. But in Continental Airlines, he was the spokesman
for an unanimous bench in delineating a discretionary task for the
Supreme Court: 8
The line separating the powers of a State from the exclusive power
of Congress is not always distinctly marked; courts must examine
82 83 Sup. Ct. 1022 (1963).
83Id. at 1024 n.5.
84 Id. at 1025.
85 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
86 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
8 T Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
88 Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 83
Sup. Ct. 1022, 1024 (1963). The most recent case dealing with powers of
the states vis-a-vis commerce among the states is Florida Lime and
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 86 Sup. Ct. 1210 (1963). In controversy
was a provision of the California agricultural code, adopted in 1925,
which prohibits the sale of avocados in California containing "less than
eight percent of oil, by weight." The provision was attacked as being
inconsistent with federal standards established by the Secretary of Agri-
culture for determining the maturity of avocados, as a denial of equal
protection under the fourteenth amendment, and as constituting an un-
reasonable burden on commerce. The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision
announced through Mr. Justice Brennan, held that federal standards
established by the Secretary of Agriculture were "minimum" stan-
dards; therefore, the California standards were not inconsistent and
federal regulations had not pre-empted the field. It also took the posi-
tion that the California regulation was not an irrational way to de-
termine the maturity of avocados and therefore did not deny Florida
growers equal protection. On the last point, however, Mr. Justice
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closely the facts of each case to determine whether the dangers and
hardships of diverse regulation justify foreclosing a State from the
exercise of its traditional powers.
TO WHICH BRANCH OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
IS COMMERCE POWER GIVEN?
In Mr. Justice Black's view, the states have no general power
to regulate interstate commerce; but, when Congress has not acted,
they may regulate subjects affecting interstate commerce except
when the state statute discriminates against interstate commerce so
as to give the state an unfair commercial advantage. Where Con-
gress and the state have both legislated, national will is supreme,
but it does not follow automatically that state law is invalid.
How does this position compare with that of Marshall? In
Gibbons v. Ogden, Marshall held that under its police power a state
may regulate commerce within its boundaries in the absence of
conflicting federal regulation, and in the Willson case he upheld
state power to regulate such commerce even though the state reg-
ulation affected interstate commerce. But in Brown v. Maryland0
he held that a state license fee, adopted under the state's power to
tax, could not be allowed to "interfere... with the power to regulate
commerce." His decision rested on two grounds: a tax on an im-
porter is a tax on imports, specifically prohibited to the states by
the Constitution; and any penalty imposed by the state on the sale
of imported articles "must be in opposition to the act of Congress
which authorizes importation." In this opinion Marshall wrote
ambiguously of a conflict between the exercise of powers remaining
in the states and "those vested in Congress." But in context, his
remarks suggest that federal action is required to clinch federal
Brennan and his colleagues remanded the case to the District Court
for the reception of evidence on the issue whether the application of
the California statute constituted an unreasonable burden on commerce.
The dissenters, in an opinion written by Mr. Justice White and
supported by Justices Black, Douglas, and Clark, thought the record
showed that six percent of Florida avocados shipped to California in
recent years had been excluded by the statute's operation and to them
the conflict between federal and state law was "unmistakable" and
"substantial." As they saw it, the federal regulatory scheme was com-
plete and left no gap which would "warrant state action to prevent the
evils of a no-man's land ... ." Id. at 4431-44. As it is quite possible that at
least one of the justices in the majority may agree with the dissenters
that the California statute imposes a burden on commerce when and il
the case comes before the Supreme Court again, the present situation is,
to say the least, confusing.
89 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 266 (1827).
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supremacy. State taxing authority, he commented, cannot restrain
the 'faction" of the national government; interfere with the "ad-
ministration" of federal justice; disturb the "collection" of taxes of
the United States; restrain the "operation of any law which Con-
gress may constitutionally pass"; or "derange the measures of
Congress to regulate commerce."
In Gibbons v. Ogden, Marshall emphasized his faith in legisla-
tive bodies, referring specifically to the plenary power of Congress
over commerce: 90
The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the
people, and the influence which their constituents possess at elec-
tions, are, in this, as in many other instances ... the sole restraints
on which they have relied, to secure them from its abuse. They are
the restraints on which the people must often rely solely, in all
representative government.
While Marshall never specifically said what the power of the
Court to rule on the constitutionality of state legislation burdening
interstate commerce should be, as the author of Marbury v. Madi-
son,91 Cohens v. Virginia,92 and McCulloch v. Maryland,93 he has
often been read uncritically as an advocate of the broad view of
judicial review. Cautionary statements-a refusal to enter into
questions of degree and the emphasis in Marbury on those clauses
in the Constitution which are "addressed especially to the courts"-
indicate a reluctance to read each grant of power to Congress as
self-executing and thus as a source of judicial authority to veto
the acts of states. And as Justice Frankfurter has pointed out, per-
haps Marshall rejected Webster's doctrine of "selective exclusive-
ness" which twenty-five years later became Supreme Court doctrine
in Cooley v. Board of Wardens because he felt the formula would
reveal "too obviously" the large powers of discretion which judges
might exercise in applying the commerce clause. 94 If this inference
is valid, the comparison with Black is even more pointed. Justice
Black has consistently placed great faith in representative legisla-
tures, at both state and national levels, and he has objected to the
Court's confident exercise of discretion.
In Gibbons v. Ogden, Marshall conceded that the state's power
of police extends to "everything within the territory of a state, not
90 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 86-87 (1824).
915 U.S. (I Cranch) 87 (1803).
92 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 120 (1821).
93 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 159 (1819).
94 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). .
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surrendered to a general government; all of which can be most
advantageously exercised by the states themselves." 95 Black would
put great stress on the word "advantageously," for he has been un-
willing to leave areas unregulated when Congress may never
adequately deal with local details. Despite burdens, he would leave
the states power to deal with them. . he stated in H. P. Hood &
Sons v. Du Mond, "[R]econciliation of state and federal interests in
regulation of commerce always has been a perplexing problem. The
claims of neither can be ignored if due regard be accorded the wel-
fare of state and nation. For in the long run the welfare of each
is dependent upon the welfare of both."90 In South-Eastern Under-
writers Association, Black commented: 97
[TJhere is a wide range of business and other activities which,
though subject to federal regulation, are so intimately related to
local welfare that, in the absence of Congressional action, they
may be regulated ... by the states. In marking out these activities
the primary test applied by the Court is ... whether, in each case,
the competing demands of the state and national interests involved
can be accommodated."
Marshall, on several occasions, relied on the "spirit of the Con-
stitution" in its interpretation. Black, like Marshall, thinks of the
Constitution as giving both the national government and the states
in our federal system positive and adequate powers. While Black's
position on state power seems Jeffersonian, and his insistence upon
Congress' plenary constitutional control over interstate commerce
may seem Hamiltonian, the paradox may be explained by the Jus-
tice's understanding that most major problems of commerce and
economic life are national and the Constitution provides Congress
with power to deal with them; but where Congress is unable or
unwilling to deal with them, the states have adequate powers to
provide for the economic welfare of their own citizens. It is this
latter "state-power-saving" construction which is so important today
when federal legislation has come to penetrate more and more
deeply into areas once occupied exclusively by the police powers
of the states, and state laws have come under increasingly frequent
attack.
CONCLUSION
The suggested approach is direct and clear-cut; it avoids most
problems of degree by the simple expedient of permitting Congress
95 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 89 (1824).
96 336 U.S. 525, 550 (1949).
97 322 U.S. 533, 548 (1944).
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the greatest possible latitude in the regulation of commercial affairs
and by shifting to the Congress almost total responsibility for seeing
to it that state regulations do not burden commerce among the
states. So far as national regulation of commerce is concerned, the
Black-Marshall formula avoids the unwieldy and inconvenient use
of the phrase "activities affecting commerce." It also avoids the
implication of something which may not be true: that there is a line
somewhere between the internal commerce of a state and commerce
among the states which the Congress is forbidden to cross.98 In
effect, the Black-Marshall formulation states that the Congress
is empowered to regulate the commercial affairs of the United
States in the same manner and to the same extent as if the power
were vested in the legislature of a unitary national government.
Where the question is simply one of federal power, results in
cases have not varied since 1937 according to the formula chosen
by the majority of the justices; national power has been sustained
consistently under the "activities affecting commerce" formula,
just as it would have been had Black's views been adopted. In this
instance, habit alone may be sufficient to account for the failure
of the other Justices to adopt Black's thorough-going position. But
habit alone certainly will not explain why the majority has not
accepted Black's rationale for governing situations where the state's
authority to affect commerce is in dispute.
This failure seems the more puzzling in the light of the dif-
ficulties the Court has experienced in finding a rational, consistent
formula to explain its decisions. Why has not the Black formula
commended itself to a majority of the Justices?
In the first place, it may be that the formula will not avoid all
difficulties. To anyone with a concern for national commerce, the
Bibb situation is well-nigh intolerable. But there is the distinct
possibility that Congress would not undertake the task that would
be thrust upon it if the Court had sustained the Illinois regulation.
As Black himself has emphasized, one reason for giving the state a
free hand is that Congress may never get around to formulating
rules on some matters of great local concern. It is not too much to
98 The authors are aware that Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495 (1935) has never explicitly been overruled, but believe
that neither formula presently used by the court to determine Congress'
power over commerce, the Black-Marshall formulation herein discussed
or the matters "affecting commerce" approach, recognizes a fixed point
at which federal power over commerce ends and the state's power be-
comes exclusive. Cf. CURTIs, LIONS UNDER THE THRONE 176 (1947).
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say that Cohgr-ess could not do the affirmative job. But equally, it
might not be able to do the negative job of correcting the impact of
state- legislation- upon interstate trade. Thus, -Jackson's gloomy
prediction of the "Balkanization" of the United States might very
well come about by-congressional default under Black's laissez-faire
construction-of the commerce clause.
While this is a possibility, it does not seem a strong probability.
Commercial interests confined, cabined, and frustrated by state
regulations Would' appeal to Congress for relief. Indications of the*
power and effectiveness of their appeals may be found in such a
i'6eceit 'instande as: the effective opposition of certain interstate in-;
dustries to the general anti-preemption statute introduced and
fought for in recent Congresses by Representative Howard Smith of
Virginia and Senator Eastland of Mississippi. Perhaps Congress
could by a general statute require the Court to do what it is doing
today; that is, pass judgment on the validity of state regulations on
a case by case basis.
But the fear that Congress might not perform this task, regard-
less of its probability, may very well be enough to inhibit a majority
of Justices from handing the job over to the legislators. For the
exercise of power by the Court in this sphere accords well with an
institutional image which a majority of the Justices through the
Court's history seem to have held. The image which seems to en-
dure is that the Court is preeminently a federal instrument; that is,
it exists to vindicate national authority, but also to preserve the
sphere of action of the states. Above all else, it is the task of the
Court to keep the nation a federal union. The well-known state-
ments on this point by Mr. Justice Holmes9 and Mr. Justice Mil-
ler's observations in the Slaughterhouse Cases'0 0 that it was the
job of the Court to hold the balance between federal and state
power with steady and even hand, even in the face of contrary
language in the Constitution itself, indicate the strength of the
federal principle among the judiciary.
In the commerce situation, the retention of ambiguous definition
of the commerce power permits Congress to extend its authority
while it permits the Court to preserve its own discretion against
99 Quoted in MENDELSON, JUSTICES BLACK AND FRANKFURTER: CONFLICT IN
HE COURT, 77 (1961).
10083 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). See also WARREN, CONGRESS, TnE CoN-
STrTUTioN, AND THE SuPREME COURT 74 (1935).
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the day when the central authority pushes its power over commerce
to the point of threatening the existence of the states. On the other
hand, a similar ambiguity permits an invisible radiation from the
commerce clause to inhibit state action by allowing the Court to
adopt a flexible approach to state regulation and thereby maintain
(probably more effectively than Congress itself) the free flow of
trade among the states in a federal union.
Finally, the adoption of the clear and precise meaning for the
words in the commerce clause and the consistent application of them
would deprive the Court of its discretion and, therefore, its power.
Perhaps for these reasons a majority of Justices have not seen fit to
follow Mr. Justice Black's doctrine on the commerce clause.
